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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature oftlte Case 
Mr. Willson appeals the Idaho Department of Transportation's suspension of his driving 
privileges for failing an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration. 
Statement o{Facts 
On November 6, 2014, Mr. Willson was detained by Officer Dupea. (Tr. P. 5, Ls. 7-10) 
Officer Dupea had contacted Mr. Willson based upon a call identifying Mr. Willson as possibly 
suicidal. (Tr. P. 5, Ls. 23-25). Officer Dupea had gone to Mr. Willson's residence and left after he 
did not locate Willson's vehicle. Dupea went down the road about one-half mile and sat stationary 
for some time until he observed Willson and followed him back to Willson's house. (Tr. P. 7, Ls. 
1 - 14). Approximately an hour before Officer Dupea's initial contact with Mr. Willson, the Nez 
Perce County Dispatch contacted Mr. Willson by phone wherein the dispatcher indicated that they 
were worried about him as possibly being suicidal. (Tr. P. 19, L. 1- P. 20, L. 1) Mr. Willson 
dispelled the false alarm and assured the dispatcher that he was fine and that he was not suicidal. (Tr. 
P. 19 Ls. 13-19. Mr. Willson then drove home and encountered Officer Dupea. (Tr., P. 19, Ls. 2-25) 
Dupea exerted his authority over Willson by directing him to get out of his vehicle. Mr. 
Willson complied. (Tr. P. 7, Ls. 20-22; Tr. P. 20, L. 25 - P. 21, L. 2). Willson about whether or not 
he was suicidal and Willson confirmed that he was fine and was not suicidal. (Tr. P. 8, Ls. 8-17; 
P. 21, Ls. 3-8) 
Officer Dupea patted Mr. Willson down for weapons (Tr. P. 7, Ls. 23-25) and the directed 
him to sit on the tailgate of his truck and not to leave. (Tr. P. 8, Ls. 1 - 7). Willson did not feel like 
he was free to leave. (Tr. P. 21, Ls. 9-13). Despite giving assurances that he was not suicidal to 
dispatch and Dupea, Officer Dupea continued to detain him and continued asking him questions that 
were not related in any way to the issue of Mr. Willson' s well being. (Tr. P. 8, Ls. 18-25). 
Corporal Florence came on scene and Dupea then conferenced with Florence about what to 
do about Willson. (Tr. P. 9, Ls. 2-25). During the conference between the two officers, Dupea stated 
that he had smelled alcohol on Wilson but was not sure what to do. (Tr. P. 9, Ls. 18-22). Corporal 
Florence responded that they could have him committed or he can "get him in by the DUI way." (Tr. 
P. 9, Ls. 23-25). In response, Dupea admits to Officer Florence that despite smelling some alcohol, 
he did not observe any other indicators of Willson being under the influence. (Tr. P. 10, Ls. 5-11) 
Acknowledging that they did not have legal cause to detain Willson, Florence suggests "you 
can ask him about where he's been and see ifhe lies, and then you can get him ifhe isn't telling the 
truth." (Tr. P. 10, Ls. 12-17). Dupea moves forward with this ruse and recontacted Willson and 
starts questioning him about text messages he may sent, general information about where he had 
been driving and where he had purchased some diesel oil. (Tr. P. 11, L. 13 - P. 12, L. 3 ). The officer 
asks about the content of text messages and Wilson offers for them to look at his cell phone but the 
officers opt not to inspect the phone. (Tr. P. 10, L. 21 - P. 11, L. 9) 
After some time passes and the officer does not catch Mr. Willson lying, Officer Dupea 
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decides to have him perform field sobriety tests. (Tr. P. 12, Ls. 4-7) The officer administered the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus, the one-leg stand and the walk and turn tests. (Tr. P. 12, Ls. 8-11 ). After 
the field sobriety tests were administered, Dupea arrested Willson and transported him to the Nez 
Perce Sheriff's facility where he administers a breath test. Mr. Willson BAC results exceed .08. 
Course of Proceedings 
Willson timely requested an ALS Hearing which was held on December 2, 2014. The 
hearing officer issued the Findings of fact and conclusions of Law on December 11, 2014 wherein 
the license suspension was upheld. Mr. Willson timely filed his Petition for Judicial Review. The 
honorable Judge Gaskill issued his memorandum Opinion and Order on Petition for Judicial Review 
on May 19, 2015 wherein he upheld the license suspension. Mr. Willson timely filed this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the Hearing Officer Commit Error by Concluding That the Arresting Officer Had Legal 
Cause to Believe That Mr. Willson Was under the Influence of Alcohol in Violation ofldaho' s DUI 
Laws? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The ALS statute, LC. § l 8-8002A, requires that the ITD suspend the driver's license of a 
driver who has failed a BAC test administered by a law enforcement officer. A person who has been 
notified of an ALS may request a hearing before a hearing officer designated by the ITD to contest 
the suspension. LC. § 18-8002A(7). At the administrative hearing, the burden of proof rests upon 
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the driver to prove any of the grounds to vacate the suspension. LC. § 18-8002A(7); Kane v. State. 
Dep 1t ofTransp., 139 Idaho 586, 590, 83 P.3d 130, 134 (Ct.App.2003). The hearing officer must 
uphold the suspension unless he or she finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has 
shown one of several grounds enumerated in LC. § 18-8002A(7) for vacating the suspension. 
Included within those grounds is the following: 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving or was 
in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or 
other intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, 
18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; 
LC. § 18-8002A(7). 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of department 
decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's driver's license. See I.C. 
§§49-330, 67-5201(2) and 67-5270. In an appeal from the decision of the district court acting in its 
appellate capacity under the IDAP A, this Court reviews the agency record independently of the 
district court's decision. Marshall v. Idaho Dep't ofTransp., 137 Idaho 337,340, 48 P.3d 666, 669 
(Ct.App.2002). This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight 
of the evidence presented. LC. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This 
Court, instead, defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda 
v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923,926,950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); ,Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 
P .3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, 
even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are 
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supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine Cnty., ex rel. Ed. 
ofComm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 
669. 
The Court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, conclusions, or 
decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory 
authority; ( c) are made upon unlawful procedure; ( d) are not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. § 67-5279(3). The party 
challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in LC. 
§ 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County 
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (l998);Peck v. State, Dept. of 
Transp., 153 Idaho 37, 42,278 P.3d 439,444 (Idaho App. 2012) 
ARGUMENT 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER DID NOT HA VE LEGAL CAUSE TO BELIEVE MR. 
WILLSON WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE IN VIOLATION OF IDAHO'S DUI LAWS. 
It is difficult to contemplate a more glaring example of an officer not possessing legal cause 
to believe a person is under the influence than what is presented in this case. The arresting officer 
admitted that he did not have sufficient evidence of Mr. Willson being under the influence so he 
engaged in a tactic of asking questions with the intention of getting Mr. ·wmson to lie to create the 
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necessary quantum of evidence to arrest him. The ruse failed so the officer administered field 
sobriety tests and, then arrested Mr. Willson for DUL The information forming the officer's belief 
that Mr. Willson was DUI was obtained through the violation of Mr. Willson's federal and state 
constitutional right against umeasonable seizures. Since the officer's beliefs were rooted in 
constitutional violations, he did not have the requisite "legal cause" for an administrative license 
suspension. Therefore, the hearing officer committed error in upholding Mr. Willson' s license 
suspens10n 
A. Legal Cause. 
For an administrative license suspension to be lawful, LC. § 18-8002A(7) requires that the 
officer have legal cause to believe that the individual is driving under the influence. Not only does 
"legal cause" define the quantum of evidence to justify an arrest or investigatory detention, it also 
necessarily restricts the evidence which can be used to form an officer's belief of someone being 
under the influence. To hold otherwise would run afoul of the constitutional protections against 
umeasonable seizures. Accordingly, to justify an license suspension the officer's belief that 
someone is under the influence, cannot be derived from a constitutional violation. In this case, 
however, Officer' Dupea's belief that Mr. Willson was under the influence originated from 
information gathered in violation of Mr. Willson's constitutional rights against umeasonable 
seizures. As such, the Administrative License Suspension should be vacated. 
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B. Applicable Law. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution, guarantees people to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. State 
v. Whitely, 124 Idaho 261,264,858 P.2d 800 (1993). The Fourth Amendment is violated when an 
individual is unlawfully seized or detained. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 
115 L.Ed. 2d 389(1991). A seizure that implicates the Fourth Amendment occurs when an officer, 
by physical force or show of authority, restrains a citizen's liberty, however briefly. Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 20, n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968). State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754. 
A seizure may take the form of either an arrest or an investigative detention. Stewart, 145 Idaho at 
644. A law enforcement officer may conduct an investigatory detention only when he or she has 
"particularized and objective" suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). An investigative detention, "must be 
carefully tailored to its underlying justification." US. v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F .3d 719, 724 (9th 
Cir. 2001 ). "A detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop" and an individual "may not be detained even momentarily without 
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647,651, 51 P.3d461, 465 
(Ct. Ap 2002) quoting, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,498, 103 S. Ct 1319,1324 (1983); US v. 
Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir. 1998). An officer must initially restrict the questions he asks 
during a stop to those that are reasonably related to the justification for the stop. Chavez-Valenzuela, 
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268 F.3d at 724. The officer may expand the scope only if he notices particularized, objective 
factors arousing his suspicion. Id "Conversely, an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
'hunch' cannot withstand scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Sokolow, 290 
U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). 
C. Officer Dupea Unlawfully Extended the Duration of the Detention. 
The original basis for the contact was the community caretaking function which, arguably, 
allowed the officer to make contact with Mr. Willson and to ask questions relevant to his well being. 
The community caretaking function involves the duty of police to help individuals officers believe 
are in need of immediate assistance. State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 692, 991 P.2d 878, 880 
(Ct.App.1999). In order for the community caretaking function analysis to apply, an officer must 
possess a subjective belief that an individual is in need of immediate assistance. State v. Schmidt, 
137 Idaho 301, 303-04, 47 P.3d 1271, 1273-74 (Ct. App. 2002). For it to apply, the officer's 
activity must be totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating 
to the violation of a criminal statute. Cadyv. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 
37 L.Ed.2d 706, 714-15 (1973); State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho at 303-04. 
Moments after Dupea's initial contact with the appellant, Mr. Willson began assuring the 
officer that he was fine and was not suicidal (cite). Mr. Willson's assurances were consistent with 
his calm and good natured spirits and the fact that he was in no way acting despondent. 
(See Dupea video). Since Mr. Willson dispelled any claim of him being suicidal, Officer Dupea 
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could no longer have relied upon the community caretaking function as a basis to continue detaining 
Mr. Willson. 
After Officer Florence arrived on scene, Dupea admitted to him that he did not observe any 
indicators that Willson was under the influence other than some smell of alcohol. The two officers 
then hatch a plan to question Mr. Willson for purpose of getting him to lie about something so that 
they could then have some basis to arrest him. Cite. When Dupea stated that he had not observed any 
indicators of Willson being under the influence, Florence told Dupea "You can ask him about where 
he been and see ifhe lies, and then you can get him ifhe isn't telling him the truth." (Tr. P. 10, Ls. 
12-17). Dupea then started asking questions Willson questions about text messages that Willson 
had made; where he had been that evening and where he got his heating oil. These questions were 
entirely unrelated in scope to the justification of his initial contact or any DUI investigation. 
This officer's agreement to pursue a criminal investigation completely eliminated any 
possible reliance upon the community care taking function since that doctrine must be completely 
divorced from the detection, investigation or acquisition of evidence relating to a crime. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 441. Further, as noted above, "A detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop" and an individual "may not be 
detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." State v. Gutierrez, 
137 Idaho 647,651, 51 P.3d 461,465 (Ct. Ap 2002) quoting, Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491,498, 
103 S. Ct 1319,1324 (1983) Here, the officers continued detention of Mr. Willson in an attempt to 
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snare him into telling lies unlawfully extended the duration of the detention in violation of his 
constitutional rights. 
D. Officer Dupea Unlawfully Expanded the Scope of the Detention. 
A law enforcement officer may conduct an investigatory detention only when he or she has 
"particularized and objective" suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). An investigative detention, "must be 
carefully tailored to its underlying justification." US. v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d 719, 724 (91h 
Cir. 2001 ). During an investigative detention, a police officer is allowed to ask questions related 
in scope to the justification for his initial contact. US. v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169,1174 (91h Cir. 
2001 ). In order to broaden the scope of questions the officer must articulate suspicious factors that 
are particularized and objective. Id. In the case at bar, once the officers initiated their endeavor 
to get Mr. Willson to lie to them, the officers illegally expanded the scope of the detention by asking 
questions that were umelated to the DUI or about Mr. Willson's welfare and, instead started asking 
questions about text messages he sent, where he had been driving, and where he had purchased diesel 
fuel. (Tr. P. 11, L. 13 - P. 12, L. 3). 
Dupea's questioning was far more lacking in legal basis then the officer's questioning in 
Gutierrez which was deemed to exceed the basis of the stop and resulted in the suppression of 
evidence obtained in a vehicle search. In Gutierrez, the officer stopped the defendants for speeding. 
Id, 137 Idaho at 649. After giving a warning for speeding the officer asked three questions; namely, 
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whether there was any alcohol, controlled substances or weapons in the vehicle. Id. The questioning 
expanded the stop for only sixty to ninety seconds. The officer claimed that the driver was unduly 
nervous, averted his eyes and made overly dramatic gestures when speaking with the officer and 
which the officer attributed to a sign of deception. Id. The officer also believed the passengers were 
acting nervously. Id. The officer then asked for and received permission to search the vehicle. The 
search revealed marijuana and paraphernalia. Id. 
The defendants, in Gutierrez moved to suppress the evidence based upon the claim that the 
officer unlawfully prolonged the detention by asking questions on matters that were unrelated to the 
purpose of the stop without reasonable suspicion. The Idaho Court of Appeals agreed, ruling that 
"Although the duration of this questioning was relatively short, lasting sixty to ninety seconds, it was 
nonetheless an unwarranted intrusion upon the vehicle occupants' privacy and liberty. Heeding the 
Supreme Court's caution that an individual "may not be detained even momentarily without 
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." Id. at 652. (Internal citations omitted.) As a result, the 
Court determined that the driver and passengers were subjected to an illegal detention at the time the 
driver gave consent to a search and, thus, the consent was tainted by the illegality and ineffective. 
Id. As a consequence, the evidence was suppressed. 
Given the holding in Gutierrez, it is clear that Dupea's questioning was not justified by any 
objective, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity . Thus, as in Gutierrez, this Court should find 
that Dupea's questioning impermissibly expanded the scope and duration of the stop in violation of 
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Mr. Willson's Fourth Amendment rights. Given this, the continued seizure to administer field 
sobriety tests was also a violation of Mr. Willson's Fourth Amendment rights such that Officer 
Dupea's subjective belief were rooted in the constitutional violation. Accordingly, Officer Dupea 
did not possess the legal cause to believe Mr. Dupea was under the influence of alcohol in violation 
ofldaho's DUI laws such that his license suspension should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above, Mr. Willson respectfully requests this Court set aside the agency's 
decision. 
DATED this 8th day of December, 2015. 
BLEWETT MUSHLITZ, LLP 
By: _ _:::~~..L_::!..!:::.:=:::::~:::::::::.._ __ _ 
Jon~ . Hally, a member of the firm 
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant 
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